Warren Buffett has stepped down as CEO at 95. Greg Abel inherits a company that paid $26.8 billion in federal income taxes last year, roughly 5% of what all of corporate America paid combined. I do not have much in common with Buffett, but I will miss his shareholder letters. Berkshire’s archive is a rare case of a public company explaining decisions candidly to its owners.
In the 2024 letter Buffett repeats Tom Murphy’s rule: “Praise by name, criticize by category.” Murphy gave him this advice 60 years ago. The letter closes with another line worth keeping: “Kindness is costless but priceless.”
Three behaviors from those letters matter. (1) Communication discipline: Between 2019 and 2023, Buffett used “mistake” or “error” 16 times in his letters. Many Fortune 500 companies never used either word once. Amazon made “brutally candid observations” in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has been happy talk and pictures. (2) Patience as allocation strategy: In the 1999 letter he told shareholders that “truly large superiorities” over the index were past because Berkshire’s size constrains opportunity. That reads today like the core constraint of the Abel era, a point I reflected on when writing about portfolio limits in 2026. (3) The non-theatrical life: Coverage of the retirement keeps returning to the same facts: still living in the Omaha home he bought in 1958, still driving 7 minutes to work every day and stopping at a drive-through for McDonald’s breakfast. The man is a true American hero.
Read the letters chronologically and you see Berkshire become a system rather than a portfolio. The early articulation is there in the 1983 letter: partnership mentality, per-share intrinsic value, and a preference for businesses that generate cash and earn strong returns on tangible equity.
The engine is insurance float. Property-casualty insurers collect premiums upfront and pay claims years or decades later. That gap creates investable capital at zero or negative cost. As Buffett puts it in the 2024 letter: “When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us, sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years.” In 2024, Berkshire’s insurance operations generated $9 billion in underwriting profit and $13.7 billion in investment income. GEICO, “repolished” over five years by Todd Combs, had what the letter calls a “spectacular” year.
On the question of where Buffett was right: if you ban the word “mistake,” risk does not vanish; it goes off balance sheet until it detonates. In the 2024 letter he writes:
I have also been a director of large public companies at which ‘mistake’ or ‘wrong’ were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous.
He was also right about scale. In 2024, 53% of Berkshire’s 189 operating businesses reported declining earnings, yet the company posted $47.4 billion in operating profit. That is diversification at scale, but also its constraint. The next decade hinges on a handful of large moves. Markets understood this as the Abel era officially began.
On a more critical note: Berkshire is an insurance-anchored allocator with operating companies plus a concentrated equity book. The 2024 marketable equity portfolio stood at $272 billion, down from $354 billion after significant Apple sales. At its peak, Apple represented roughly 40-50% of Berkshire’s public equity holdings. A single stock, bought mostly between 2016 and 2018, drove a substantial portion of portfolio returns over the past decade. The rest is insurance. This is not a criticism of the Apple thesis (it was correct), but the Buffett track record includes one very large, very right bet on a technology company he famously avoided for most of his career. His letters do not pretend error is rare; they treat delay as the sin. He has been candid about blind spots, discussing lessons from IBM and airlines.
Berkshire’s businesses also face difficult labor dynamics. BNSF has drawn union criticism over attendance policies and OSHA findings in retaliation cases. The railroad earned $5 billion in 2024, flat with 2023.
So what now? Abel inherits roughly $300 billion in cash and Treasury bills. The letter explains this is not a preference for cash: “Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.” The cash is a byproduct of not finding anything worth buying at current prices. The first large capital move will tell us more than any profile can, which is why coverage keeps circling back to the cash pile and the question of how much “Buffett premium” was embedded in Berkshire shares.
If Buffett truly goes quiet, I hope he gets to experience not working at all, or at least the version that suits a man who prefers thinking to talking. The compounding may continue just fine.